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André Krouwel * 
All Politics is National, but Policy is Supra-







he establishment of a European Union is no minor 
achievement:  
No other institution in the world brings together 
under one roof representatives from different na-
tional states, who have been directly elected to that 
institution and who have been given a range of le-
gally entrenched powers. Nowhere is there an equi-
valent body, eager both to exercise its powers be-
yond the reach of individual governments and to ex-
tend its influence over the decisions that are taken 
above the national level.1 
However, this optimistic perspective on the EU is not 
shared by all, and several points made in the above 
quotation require qualification.  
First, the ability of the European Parliament to “ex-
ercise power beyond the reach of individual govern-
ments” and the extent to which political representa-
tives at the European level have “influence over deci-
sions that are taken above the national level” is que s-
tionable. National politicians (prime ministers, ministers 
and heads of state) dominate the decision-making 
process at the European level, not supra -national ones.  
Furthermore, the legitimacy of members of the 
European Parliament is very weak as a result of low 
turnouts at European elections and they do not have 
sufficient powers to hold the European executive ac-
countable or to counterbalance policy decisions made 
by national political actors. The European “executive” 
still consists of national politicians in the form of the 
Council of Ministers, while Commissioners are still se-
lected and appointed by national governments. This 
leads not only to the blurring of the boundary between 
the executive and the legislature at the European level, 
but also to a political system in which democratic ac-
countability and control are routed primarily via the 
national level. The European Parliament’s ability to 
scrutinize policy implementation is strongly restricted 
by the fact that the latter takes place at the national 
level.  
                    
* Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Political Science. 
1  Corbett et al. 1995 : 3. 
Finally, national political parties are responsible for 
the selection of supra -national politicians, whose ca-
reers are, by and large, controlled by national party 
leaders, which reduces their autonomy dramatically. 
Together, these elements constitute a significant 
discrepancy in the EU political process: while political 
parties and their leaders are still dependent on the na-
tional political and institutional context for their elec-
toral success and control of government, their political 
fate is often determined by the success – or otherwise 
– of policies which are increasingly being developed at 
the supra-national level within a multi-tiered process. 
In short, while politics is still primarily a national affair, 
policy-making is increasingly supra-national in charac-
ter.  
In this paper I will show that politics is national in 
terms of both issue salience and elite recruitment pa t-
terns, while policy-making is increasingly being shifted 
to the supra -national level where popular support and 
legitimacy are low and democratic control is inade-
quate. This supra -national level of decision-making is 
characterized above all by nationally elected politicians 
who face little opposition, scrutiny or democratic su-
pervision.  
All politics is national: the absence of the 
EU issue in national politics 
While an increasing number of issue arenas are being 
brought under EU authority – particularly the politically 
crucial macroeconomic policy issues in terms of which 
national parties compete (see Schmitter 1996, 125) – 
hitherto most European parties have not paid much 
attention to this transfer of power: politics in Europe is 
still a national affair and the question of the EU re-
mains absent from electoral competition. 
To give an example, Table 1 shows the marginal – if 
not negligible – amount of attention devoted to the 
issue of European integration in party manifestos 
across European countries during national elections 
since 1970. On average, around 2% to 3% of party 
platforms concern pro- or anti-EU standpoints. Even in 
countries where there have been fierce political and 
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public debates on entry or exit (the UK and Sweden), 
or where national referenda have been held on EU is-
sues (Denmark, France, Italy), the EU issue in party 
platforms still has very low status and is often absent 
from national political campaigning (see also Binnema 
2003). 
Table 1. Significance of the EU issue in national party 









Austria 0.8 0.5 1.7 1.1 
Belgium 3.1 2.2 2.0 2.6 
Denmark  1.9 1.6 3.0 2.1 
Finland 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.5 
France 3.2 2.0 4.2 3.0 
Germany 4.6 3.6 4.6 4,2 
Greece 1.5 1.4 4.1 2.5 
Ireland 0.2 1.0 3.1 1.5 
Italy 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.3 
Luxembourg 3.4 4.9 3.6 4.2 
Netherlands 1.3 2.5 3.5 2.2 
Portugal 0.7 2.3 4.0 2.1 
Spain 2.0 3.6 4.2 3.3 
Sweden 0.3 0.9 5.3 2.3 
UK 3.4 2.3 4.7 3.3 
Average  1.7 1.9 3.3 2.3 
Source: Binnema 2002. Data from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (for description see Budge et al. 2001, pp. 222–8). In-
cluded are items labeled per108 and per110, which refer to fa-
vorable or hostile mentions of European Community/Union and 
expansion of the EU or the desirability of remaining a member, 
joining, or leaving the EU. The average scores in the last column 
are weighted for the number of elections in a given period. 
The results of a number of other analyses point in 
the same direction. It has been shown that there is lit-
tle competition between major party families over 
European integration (Hix 1997); that the positions of 
the major parties on European issues do not deviate 
much (Marks and Wilson 2000); and that European 
integration has had little effect on the format and me-
chanics of party systems (Mair 2000).  
As far as the major party families (Christian democ-
rats, liberals and social democrats) are concerned, be-
tween 1976 and 1994 they gradually converged to-
wards moderate pro-integration positions. Hix (1997) 
even speaks of a pro-integration “cartel” of major pa r-
ties. This cartel has left room for parties to the extreme 
left and right of the political spectrum to compete with 
the major parties on the basis of an anti-integration 
agenda (see Marks and Wilson 2000; Hix 1997; Mair 
2000; Taggart 1998). However, even these parties 
tend to “normalize” and become pragmatic pro-
European actors as soon as they enter national gov-
ernment (Bomberg 2002); this is what happened, for 
example, to the Austrian FPÖ and the German Green 
Party.2  
This seems to confirm Mair’s assertion that the 
process of European integration has had little impact 
on national party competition. Out of more than 140 
new parties that have competed in recent elections 
across Europe, only three can be directly linked to the 
issue of European integration (in Austria, Finland and 
the UK) and none of them received more than 2.6% of 
the vote. Mair (2000, 31) concludes that European in-
tegration “has had virtually no direct or even demon-
strable effect on the format of the na tional party sys-
tems”. In addition, political parties appear to subsume 
the EU issue under other issues within existing areas of 
conflict: parties respond to “new” issues such as Euro-
pean integration on the basis of their historical origins 
and ideological schemas that are rooted in political 
cleavages salient in their own national political system. 
In this manner, attitudes to the EU issue reflect centu-
ries of national political conflict. Marks and Wilson 
(2000, 459) conclude that “European integration is 
domestic politics [conducted] by other means”. 
In terms of the mechanics of party systems, on the 
other hand, Mair (2000) shows that the EU issue has 
not been particularly divisive. A large majority of the 
“European electorate” vote for political parties that are 
strongly pro-European and on average only 8% vote 
for parties which are strongly against European inte-
gration. Only in the UK, Austria and Italy do the main-
stream parties depart from a pattern of overall pro-
European consensus (see also Raunio and Wiberg 
2000, 155–7). 
To sum up, overall there seems to be little or no 
electoral competition on the EU issue, with the possi-
ble exception of the UK, Sweden and Denmark, while 
the significance of the EU issue in party platforms is 
low. A pro-European consensus is clearly discernable: 
                    
2  Deviations from this pattern of pro-European consensus can 
easily be explained in terms of national factors: EU issues be-
come a matter of party competition if internal divisions de-
velop. This is what happened to the Conservative Party in the 
UK (see Aylott 2002), but also to the Scandinavian social de-
mocratic pa rties, which have been more Eurosceptic than 
other continental social democratic parties for reasons of na-
tional party competition. Hence, as a result of national polit i-
cal developments, although on average the positions of party 
families are largely similar and their variations show significant 
overlaps, party families have become more heterogeneous on 
the issue of European integration (see Marks and Wilson 
2000; also Ray 1999).  
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the issue of European integration is often depoliticized 
and national party elites find little opposition or con-
testation.  
The “nationalization” of party competition 
at the EU level 
While European integration has had little impact on 
national patterns of political competition, “nationaliza-
tion” of the supra -national or EU level is high: the 
process of European integration strengthens the posi-
tion of party leaders vis-à-vis their national parliaments 
and their parliamentary parties, and national party 
leaders dominate the policy-making process at the EU 
level.  
This is visible in at least four related aspects. First, 
party leaders have increasingly come to dominate their 
national party organization at the expense of the 
members. Second, while national parliaments have be-
come weaker, the powers of the European Parliament 
have not been increased sufficiently to compensate for 
this loss in national democratic control. Third, transna-
tional party organizations remain weak and their com-
position is determined by national party leaderships. 
Finally, the process of European integration has in-
creased the power of national party leaders: summits 
make the information deficit of national pa rliaments 
even worse and provide national party leaders with an 
additional – and high-profile – political arena by means 
of which national parliaments can be sidelined. We 
shall clarify these points in what follows. 
The emergence of the strong party leader 
Since their emergence in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, political parties have changed 
significantly. Party leaders have professionalised their 
party organizations extensively, in particular – on the 
continent – by means of substantial funding from the 
state, thereby making parties less dependent on mem-
bership fees and voluntary activism by party members. 
This marginalisation of the membership in numerical 
and financial terms is matched by their negligible influ-
ence on leadership selection and policy formation 
(Krouwel 1999).  
Table 2. Levels of party membership in European democracies, 1945–2000 (% of total electorate) 
 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s X Beta (ß) 
Austria 23.8 26.1 29.8 29.1 25.9 13.5 24.7 –.179 
Belgium     7.7   8.6   8.9   5.9   7.8 –.253 
Denmark  18.3 20.9 17.4 10.1   7.1   5.0 13.1   –.573* 
Finland   18.4 15.7 13.5   9.2 14.2 –.145 
France  8.3   3.0   1.5   3.2   2.9   1.3   3.4 –.305 
Germany  4.3  2.6   3.1   4.2   4.3      3.1   3.6 –.210 
Greece      3.1   5.8   6.7   5.2 .461 
Ireland     5.5   9.1 11.8   3.0   7.4 –.582* 
Italy 11.9 12.9 16.4 11.4   9.6  12.5 –.425* 
Netherlands 12.9 10.9   7.9   4.6   3.4   2.1 10.0 –.404* 
Norway 14.0 12.7 13.7 11.6 13.0   8.7 12.3 –.345* 
Portugal      2.8   4.9   4.6   4.1 –.209 
Spain       1.7   2.8   2.3 .575* 
Sweden 20.2    19.5 21.1 21.5 22.3   6.1 18.5 –.259 
Gt. Britain  9.4    10.8   2.4   3.7   3.5   2.0   5.3 –.630* 
 Average 13.7    13.3 12.1  9.9   9.2   4.9   9.6 –.247* 
Source: Krouwel 1999.  
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t=<.05). The column marked “X” lists the a v-
erage of the periods and the column marked :Beta (ß)“ provides regression coefficients between the exact center point in the party sys-
tem and the year of observation. 



















Otto Kirchheimer (1966; 1969 [1954]) was among the 
first to point out this marginalisation of members as a 
source of financial support for what he labeled “catch-
all parties”. In catch-all parties members have only a 
marginal role in increasingly professional election cam-
paigns and in internal decision-making processes. 
Therefore, catch-all parties tend not to attempt to in-
corporate a large proportion of their supporters as 
party members and require limited member involve-
ment in party activities. 
This “de -membering” and societal uprooting of po-
litical parties is perhaps best illustrated in terms of 
membership levels. Table 2 summarizes national trends 
in the level of party membership.  
Although there are substantial differences in levels 
of party membership across Europe, the trend is one of 
consistent decline in most European democracies, pa r-
ticularly since the 1980s. The steepest decline over 
time is found in the UK, Denmark, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Ireland and France, while the downward trend 
in Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden is more 
moderate but still marked. The democratic hiatuses in 
Greece and Spain resulted in low levels of party mem-
bership and these southern European countries now 
form the exceptions to the general trend of declining 
party membership.  
Katz and Mair (1995) have argued that there is no 
linear evolution of party transformation. While party 
grassroots (members and activists) are in decline, party 
central offices and especially parties in public office 
have increased their financial and human resources, 
reinforcing the dominance of party elites over party 
organizations (see also Webb 1995; for criticism see 
Detterbeck 2001; Koole 1996; Kitschelt 2000; Von 
Beyme 1996; Yishai 2001; Young 1998).  
This partial decline of political parties, with the ex-
tra-parliamentary party losing many of its functions, is 
related to the disappearance of the mass-party format. 
The modern means of communication available to pa r-
liamentary leaderships make the party membership less 
necessary for interaction with the voters. Parliamentary 
representatives have used their legislative powers to 
accumulate their own resources for the purpose of po-
litical competition. As a result, for example in terms of 
finances and personnel, parliamentary party organiza-
tions are increasing their resources at an unprece-
dented rate (Krouwel 1999; Farrell and Webb 2000) 
and the parliamentary party group has become the 
most powerful section of the party, dominating the 
party on the ground (Helms 2000; Heidar and Koole 
2000).  
A weak European Parliament … 
European integration has helped to shift the intra-party 
power balance even more in favor of national party 
leaders. The major factor contributing to this develop-
ment is the power imbalance between national execu-
tives, who constitute and domina te the supra-national 
executive of the European Union, and the relatively 
weak European Parliament which lacks (legislative) 
powers and cannot hold the executive fully account-
able for its actions.  
On the first point, the popular representatives in the 
European Parliament lack the right to draft legislation 
in many areas and can scrutinize policy implementation 
only to a limited degree. During the 1950s the powers 
of the Assembly were slowly increased from mere 
monitoring to (albeit weak) budgetary, consultation 
and advisory powers. Only since 1979 has the Parlia-
ment been democratically elected, and with the Single 
European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and 
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), European Parliament 
authority over the legislative process and the EU 
budget was increased. Constitutional changes intro-
duced after the Amsterdam summit extended the 
scope of issues over which the European Parliament 
has co-decision-making powers. However, the rela-
tively weak European Parliament is still the only directly 
elected body in the EU.  
Second, the legislature cannot hold the executive 
(Commission and Council of Ministers) accountable 
and it can determine its composition only to a minimal 
degree. Democratic standards of representative de-
mocracy are violated at the EU level because citizens 
who vote in elections can neither directly nor indirectly 
influence the composition of the EU executive.  
The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties did give the 
European Parliament a role in appointing the Commis-
sion and the right to a “vote of investiture” as regards 
the President of the Commission. While at first glance 
this may resemble the parliamentary origin of the chief 
executive this is not the case, for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, the European executive is a dual ex-
ecutive, in which the Commission shares executive 
power with national governments via the Council of 
Ministers and the European Council. The dual execu-
tive (Council of Ministers and the Commission) is not 
accountable to the voters, either directly or indirectly 
(via the European Parliament). Ministers participating in 
the Council are accountable only via national parlia-
ments and through national elections (Hix 1997, 1). On 
the other hand, since the Council is dominant and has 
substantial nominating power with regard to the 
Commissioners, it is clear that the European Parliament 
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has little autonomy and basically ‘rubber-stamps’ deci-
sions already made by national political leaders. The 
key actors in the selection and nomination of Commis-
sioners are still the national political elites. The power 
of the European Parliament is weak also in respect of 
the termination of the executive term: the European 
Parliament can force the whole Commission to resign 
by means of a vote of confidence, but not individual 
Commissioners. 
… made up of poorly developed supra-national 
party organizations … 
There is little evidence of the emergence of a genuine 
European party system (Mair 2000, 28). Such a 
development is also unlikely to occur since the 
presence and significance of social cleavages, as well 
as the structure of party systems, vary substantially 
across European countries; the process of enlargement 
makes this even more improbable (Bardi 1994, 369–
70). Moreover, as long as there is no executive office 
to compete for at the European level, party 
competition will be severely limited. As a result, politics 
at the EU level is conducted between national actors, 
while transnational party groups are made up of 
unstable and heterogeneous alliances of national 
parties (Andeweg 1995).3 N verthel ss, some authors claim there is a devel-
opment towards genuine Euro-parties. Hix (1996, 
311), for example, argues that “the party federations 
have evolved towards European parties”. Like most 
observers, Hix bases this assertion mainly on evidence 
of increasing cohesion in the voting behavior of the 
transnational party groups. According to Hix and 
Raunio “tribe” no longer seems to dominate “ideol-
ogy” and party cohesion at the EU level is increasing 
(Raunio 2000; Hix 1997; Hix et al. 2003a). Several 
studies have analyzed the roll-call behavior of the 
transnational party groups in the European Parliament 
and have concluded that their cohesion and voting dis-
cipline has grown since 1980 (see Attiná 1990; Quanjel 
and Wolters 1992; Brinzsky 1995). However, cross-
                    
3  Bardi (1994, 359) regards the transnational party structures in 
the European Parliament as “only a se cond co-existing and, to 
an extent, competing party system”. Transnational political 
groups vary in the number of member states they represent: 
from the PES and EPP spanning the entire Union to party 
groups including only a small number of national parties. 
However, the EPP is a sometimes unhappy alliance between 
Christian Democrats and conservative parties (see van Hecke 
2003). Bardi concludes that the transnational party organisa-
tions, in terms of political relevance or organizational struc-
ture, hardly play a role during EP election campaigns and 
“common manifestos are practically ignored by nationally se-
lected EP candidates” (Bardi 1994, 369).  
time analysis of the voting behavior of transnational 
party groups in the European Parliament has revealed 
that the cohesion of the European People’s Party and 
European Democrats (EPP-ED) has diminished, while 
the MEPs from two of the other main European party 
groups, the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the 
European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) 
vote increasingly along transnational party lines (Hix et 
al. 2003b; Faas 2003). Furthermore, within all party 
groups there is evidence that some MEPs tend to vote 
on the basis of national lines rather than following 
their EP party group. Anti-European national parties in 
particular, such as the British Conse rvatives, Forza Italia 
and Scandinavian parties, vote against the majority po-
sitions of their EP groups (Hix 2001, 684; Hix et al. 
2003a, 38–41). Other party groups, such as the Union 
for a Europe of the Nations (UEN), Group for a Europe 
of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and the non-
affiliated group have a relatively low level of structural 
cohesion in terms of voting behavior. Overall, the left-
wing political groups have a higher level of cohesion 
than right-wing ones.  
Analysis of the voting behavior of party groups at 
the European level brings to light a number of cleav-
ages on which party conflicts tend to concentrate. The 
literature refers, on the one hand, to a conflict be-
tween center and periphery – between national inter-
ests and deepening European integration – and on the 
other hand to a cleavage based on the traditional left–
right division (Hix 1996, 1997 and 2001; Hix and Lord 
1997; Hix et al. 2003a; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; At-
tiná 1990). However, this structure could also be seen 
as evidence of the claim made in this paper that na-
tional lines of conflict (namely the left–right cleavage 
that is present in all European systems) have simply 
been transposed to the supra-national level, where 
they are combined with a struggle between national 
actors over the extent to which sovereignty should be 
pooled at the European level or should remain at the 
level of the nation state. This coincides with the obse r-
vation of Hix et al. (2003b, 24) that while national in-
terests dominate voting in the Council, the left–right 
divide structures voting behavior in the European Par-
liament.  
… whose members are recruited and selected by 
national party leaders  
European integration has had an impact on internal 
shifts of power which have increased the autonomy of 
national party leaderships and transformed the func-
tioning of national political parties. The democratic 



















functioning of parties seems increasingly limited to the 
recruitment of political personnel and the organization 
of electoral campaigns to get candidates elected to 
legislative and executive office. However, the pool 
from which this elite is recruited has been progressively 
narrowed to a small number of professional groups, 
primarily in the public sector (Blondel and Thiebault 
1991; Eldersveld et al. 1995; Krouwel 1999). This na r-
rowing of the recruitment base to civil servants has 
also reinforced the specialization, professionalization 
and technocratization of the political arena. Political 
parties are increasingly experiencing problems in mobi-
lizing the populace outside the professional bureau-
cratic and political class. 
Over the last few decades, national party leaders 
have maintained their dominant role in the recruit-
ment, selection, nomination and appointment of poli-
ticians at the EU level: MEPs and European Commis-
sioners, including the Commission President (Hix 1997, 
3). The power distribution within candidate selection 
procedures is important as they influence the (voting) 
behavior of elected politicians. Politicians will show 
most loyalty to party bodies or groups of individuals 
which influence their (re-)selection. Hix has recently 
shown that when a conflict exists between an MEP 
and the national party and the European Parliamentary 
group, the MEP will be more likely to vote against the 
European Parliamentary group and in line with the na-
tional party if the latter is in a position to “punish” him 
or her (Hix 2003a, 24–25). If a national party is able to 
control its MEPs through electoral institutions, particu-
larly “closed-list” proportional representation, small 
districts and centralized candidate selection proce-
dures, MEPs will toe the national party line. Thus, if the 
procedure is centralized and deputies depend for their 
reselection on the central party leadership, they will 
avoid deviant voting behavior in the European Parlia-
ment.  
Selection procedures for (European) parliamentary 
candidates have been democratized over the last dec-
ade: more and more candidate selection procedures 
have been opened up to all party members under a 
one man–one vote system. Kitschelt (2000) has noted 
this increasing sensitivity on the part of party leaders to 
the preferences of the wider membership and the elec-
torate at large. Party leaders often regard the activist 
body of their party as largely unrepresentative of the 
total membership and certainly of the wider electorate. 
However, this “democratization” does not necessarily 
mean that national party elites are losing control over 
candidate selection. Mair (1994, 16) has argued that it 
“is not the party congress or the middle level elite, or 
the activists, who are being empowered, but rather the 
‘ordinary’ members, who are at once more docile and 
more likely to endorse the policies (and candidates) 
proposed by the party leadership”. This introduction of 
more plebiscitary techniques means that well-informed 
middle-level activists are being circumvented and party 
leaders are appealing directly to ordinary – and disen-
gaged – party members. The fact that activists are 
generally not representative of the electorate at large 
now looms large and party leaderships try to sideline 
them. By means of this new “democratization” inter-
nal dissent and discussion are expunged from the 
grassroots party, making it possible, among other 
things, to proclaim party unity. 
While control over the careers of supra-national 
politicians is the most powerful means of policy con-
trol, national party leaders have adopted other mecha-
nisms to direct the behavior of their MEPs and Com-
missioners. The most important tool of these is policy 
coordination. Raunio (2000) has shown that since 
MEPs are strongly dependent on their national parties 
for re-election they are eager and willing to consult 
with and inform the national party leadership of their 
voting record and intentions. The increasing impor-
tance of EU legislation has resulted in more frequent 
contacts between national party leaders and their 
MEPs, leading to their increasing institutionalization: 
that is, transnational politicians are progressively being 
integrated into national party organizations. Leaders of 
the “European” part of the party are represented on 
the national executive and the national leadership has 
frequent meetings with most MEPs. Often, the leade r-
ship of the transnational party has direct access to min-
isters (particularly when their party is in government) 
and to the parliamentary leade rship at the national 
level. MEPs tend to have political experience at the na-
tional level, which eases their access to the national 
leadership. Although there is little evidence of explicit 
voting instructions, except in relation to issues of 
“fundamental importance”, the fact that MEPs of 
many parties acknowledge the possibility of national 
intervention at the supra-national level says something 
about power relations between the two. However, 
even without direct voting instructions there is ample 
opportunity to influence MEPs’ behavior. Although, as 
the deepening and widening of Europe continues – a 
process that has gained momentum since the early 
1990s – MEPs have gained in importance within their 
parties, this has not resulted in a significant shift in pol-
icy control towards the supra-national level. 
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European integration strengthens national gov-
ernments (in other words, national party elites) 
European integration has transformed the functioning 
and performance of national political institutions such 
as parliaments, political parties and governments, as 
well as legislative–executive relations in national de-
mocracies. One major effect has been that power has 
shifted from parliament both to the executive and, 
upwards, to EU institutions. The room for national pol-
icy-making is restricted and shrinking (see Streeck 
1996, 83–85) with the result that governments (that is, 
national party elites) are experiencing a diminution in 
policy-making terms, but a gain in autonomy vis-à-vis 
their national parliamentary pa rties. Indeed, the latter 
have suffered significantly in terms of power and policy 
influence and are now less capable of scrutinizing their 
national executives. Raunio and Hix (2000, 163) con-
clude that “overall, the ability of parliaments to control 
executives has declined since the 1950s, and the proc-
ess of European integration is certainly one of the rea-
sons why this has happened – providing executives 
with an arena for action away from domestic parlia-
mentary scrutiny, and a monopoly on information in 
an ever larger portfolio of public policies”. 
The shift of policy-making to the European level has 
strengthened the power of the national executive elites 
(Moravcsik 1994), while national governments are us-
ing EU institutions to further strengthen their powers 
vis-à-vis the national legislature and other national ac-
tors (Raunio and Hix 2000). Particularly in terms of 
agenda-setting the powers of national executives have 
also widened the information gap between national 
political leaders and the average (national) MP. In addi-
tion, the piecemeal scrutiny of individual items of – of-
ten complex – EU legislation in national parliaments 
makes parliamentary oversight and control increasingly 
problematic. It also reduces the scope of policy forma-
tion and makes radical policy shifts increasingly infea-
sible, which makes it difficult for national actors to re-
spond to the wishes of the electorate. One of the 
strategies adopted by national leaders is “scapegoa t-
ing”: unpopular policies are blamed on the European 
Union and presented as faits accomplis. Also, national 
leaders return from European summits and present 
package deals to the national parliament which the 
latter cannot easily reject because this would entail po-
litical leaders going back to the European negotiating 
table looking weak and unreliable.  
The autonomy of the leadership of political parties is 
greater in countries with weak parliamentary scrutiny 
over EU affairs (Raunio 2002). The fact that national 
parliaments have attempted to regain control and 
oversight and to hold their government accountable 
can be shown by the establishment of special commit-
tees for European affairs in all European countries (see 
Raunio and Hix 2000, 154–9; Raunio and Wiberg 
2000, 150–4). In addition, several member states have, 
in response to the transposition of EU directives into 
national law, introduced constitutional changes to 
strengthen the legislature’s ability to control the execu-
tive. Nevertheless, most of these special EU committees 
are weak in terms of their ability to mandate the gov-
ernment or to bridge the information gap that exists 
between the national executive and parliamentary rep-
resentatives (Raunio and Wiberg 2000, 151).  
However, we must not exaggerate the loss of par-
liamentary control and inter-party competition as a re-
sult of Europeanization. Before the process of Euro-
pean integration took off, a small elite of party and 
interest-group leaders dominated parliamentary repre-
sentatives, particularly in consensus democracies with 
strong corporatist decision-making procedures. Never-
theless, the position of the leadership of the major na-
tional parties has been enhanced as a result of the 
European integration process. Opposition parties in 
particular, which at the national level could always 
seek popular or interest-group support in order to fur-
ther their case and oppose the government, are being 
progressively “disarmed” as national executives be-
come less directly accountable and controllable. 
The democratic dilemma of the EU:  
distrusted institutions, low electoral  
turnout, widespread dissatisfaction 
Political parties trusted least 
Political parties are becoming less and less socially em-
bedded. They are losing their members, their core vot-
ers and their popular appeal. However, declining 
membership levels do not tell the whole story. Political 
participation may simply be shifting to other political 
organizations or towards more ad-hoc forms of politi-
cal engagement. In simple terms, party-political activi-
ties may be out of date and no longer square with 
people’s everyday lives. We may demonstrate the pro-
found change in citizens’ attitudes towards party de-
mocracy by evaluating their psychological predisposi-
tions towards the main institutions of representative 
democracy.  



















This analysis is disheartening: as Table 3 clearly 
shows, only around one third of Europeans consider 
core democratic institutions such as government, par-
liament, the civil service and political parties trustwor-
thy. However, political parties are the least trusted of 
all: only one in six citizens trusts them. 
However, it is not so much the structure of repre-
sentative democracy as a whole that is under siege, 
but rather its agents (established parties and politi-
cians) as well as certain procedures of public policy-
making that have little credibility with the population 
at large. A gap seems to have developed between 
“politics” and society. Does this mean that we have an 
indifferent, dissatisfied and cynical European citizenry? 
We will assess this on the basis of electoral turnout 
and surveys of people’s satisfaction with national and 
European democracy.  
European elections are second-order elections 
with low turnout 
One of the core requirements for a democracy is active 
citizen participation. Electoral participation thus is an 
indicator of the importance people attach to certain 
democratic institutions. 
Several scholars have claimed that higher levels of 
education and income tend to increase political par-
ticipation; paradoxically, however, while educational 
levels and income have risen substantially, aggregate 
levels of voter turnout have declined significantly over 
the post-war period in most European countries (Mair 
2002, 128–9). Average turnout in the advanced indus-
trialized countries has declined, from an average of 
around 84% in 1945 to one of 78% in the 1990s.  
Many factors have been put forward as influencing 
political participation. Gray and Caul (2000) have 
shown that within highly developed democracies the 
Table 3. Trust in political institutions in percentages, 1989–2003 
 
Trust in political parties      Trust in political institutions 
Country 1997 1999 2001 2003 1999 2001 2002 2003 
Austria 24 22 23 20 45 49 47 45 
Belgium 10 17 17 22 26 44 40 36 
Denmark  31 27 34 37 43 58 54 50 
Finland  14 20 22 24 43 46 43 43 
France 12 11 11 15 32 38 30 32 
Germany 13 18 16 11 37 40 35 36 
Greece 20 20 18 17 38 43 34 34 
Ireland 20 21 24 20 39 47 44 42 
Italy 13 16 11 15 25 31 29 25 
Netherlands 40 40 32 33 56 58 52 52 
Norway – – – – – – – 31 
Portugal 14 19 19 21 44 45 40 39 
Spain 20 19 24 23 38 45 40 40 
Sweden 16 17 18 20 34 49 49 40 
Gt. Britain 18 16 15 13 34 38 34 27 
Average  16 18 17 16 
 
35 45 36 35 
Source:  Various Eurobarometers 1997–2003. 
Note: * Trust in four political institutions: government, parliament, civil service and political parties. 
Internationale Politikanalyse 




decline in turnout is best explained by the transforma-
tion of patterns of popular mobilization (decline in 
trade union density and lower levels of political organi-
zation of peripheral voters through workers’ parties), 
faster growing voting-age populations (making politi-
cal mobilization more costly) and a country’s institu-
tional format (particularly the electoral system). The 
number of parties seems to have a positive effect on 
turnout, but only up to a point: too much fragmenta-
tion discourages people from casting their vote.  
Similar effects have been found in Eastern Europe. 
In the wake of the transition towards pluralist democ-
racy, the initial popular enthusiasm for electoral pa r-
ticipation has declined rapidly. Kostadinova (2003, 
752) shows that in the founding national elections the 
average turnout was over 86%, while in the most re-
cent elections the average turnout was only 66.6%. 
This decline is best explained, next to the specific dy-
namics of democratic transition, by the electoral sys-
tem and the number of parties.  
Moreover, if we look at electoral turnout in “sec-
ond-order elections”, such as sub-national elections or 
those for the European Parliament, a sobering picture 
emerges. Elections to the European Parliament have 
failed to generate high levels of participation and in-
volvement among European voters. Indeed, consider-
ing the substantial drop in participation in the 1999 
European elections, it seems that despite the increased 
powers of the European Parliament and the greater 
importance of EU policy-making (for example, as a re-
sult of the introduction of the single currency), fewer 
and fewer people appear to be connecting to the po-
litical process at the EU level. This might be caused by 
some of the factors described above: parties are not 
able to present, and compete in terms of, coherent 
and alternative visions of “Europe” and tend to regard 
Euro-elections as an arena dominated by national 
competition (Scully 2001, 518; Andeweg 1995, 73).  
High levels of voter abstention at Euro-elections 
may also be attributed to more direct causes. Moravc-
sik (2002, 616) has argued that the issues on the EU 
agenda are simply not salient enough for voters to be  
interested in them. Whatever the reasons for voter 
apathy, EU elections mobilize far fewer voters than na-
tional elections. Table 4 summarizes turnouts at na-
tional elections and elections for the European Parlia-
ment in 24 countries. Since no elections for represen-
tatives at the European level have been held in acces-
sion countries, I have taken turnouts in EU referenda as 
a proxy for the importance voters attach to the process 
of European integration and European-level politics in 
general. 
Table 4: Electoral turnout at parliamentary and Euro-


















Austria 80.6 58.35 – –22.2 
Belgium 86.4 91.04 – + 4.6 
Czech Rep. 77.8 – 55.2 –22.6 
Denmark 83.4 43.76 – –39.6 
Estonia 68.0 – 64.0 –4.0 
Finland 75.2 45.20 – –30.0 
France 62.5 52.16 – –10.4 
Germany 76.7 58.02 – –18.7 
Greece 86.8 75.42 – –11.4 
Hungary 65.5 – 45.6 –19.9 
Ireland 74.6 54.80 – –19.8 
Italy 90.9 79.30 – –11.6 
Latvia 77.8 – 72.5 –5.3 
Lithuania 64.3 – 63.3 –1.0 
Luxemburg 63.4 87.52 – + 24.2 
Netherlands 78.5 44.28 – –34.3 
Poland 47.3 – 58.6 + 11.3 
Portugal 78.4 49.75 – –28.7 
Romania 76.0 – 54.0 –22.0 
Slovakia 82.1 – 52.2 –29.9 
Slovenia 78.2 – 60.2 –18.0 
Spain 74.3 61.80 – –12.5 
Sweden 83.4 39.95 – –43.5 
Great Britain 73.3 32.16 – –41.2 
Average  75.2 60.15 58.4 -16.9 
Source: Data on electoral participation from the IPU, IFES and EU 
websites. 
Overall, voter participation in national elections is 
much higher than in Euro-elections – only in three 
countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and Poland) do more 
people go to the polls for European elections or refe r-
enda than for national elections. While the overall av-
erage for national elections is 75%, the overall turnout 
at European elections and EU referenda is 15% to 



















17% lower. From this evidence it seems that elections 
for the European Parliament are clearly second- or 
even third-order elections in the eyes of many Euro-
pean voters (Reiff and Schmitt 1980; Hix 1996 and 
1999b; Hix and Lord 1997).  
Moreover, in half the member states the turnout for 
the European Parliamentary elections is less than 50%, 
and of those countries where participation is above 
average there is compulsory voting in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and Greece (also in Italy until recently). In Italy 
and Greece the turnout rates are just above 70%, 
while in Austria just under 60% of the population cast 
their vote at European elections. Turnouts in Finland, 
Spain and Germany are just above the average at 
European elections, while in France and Denmark they 
are just below the average. The lowest turnouts at 
European elections are found in the UK, Ireland, Swe-
den, Portugal and, particularly, the Netherlands. In 
countries such as Sweden, the UK, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, the difference between turnouts at na-
tional elections and at European elections is a striking 
30% to 40%. 
Since they are offered neither a real choice among 
competing visions of Europe nor an opportunity to de-
termine the composition of the European executive, 
European electorates seem to “vote with their feet” 
rather than with their heads or hearts (Eijk and Franklin 
1996, 301–4). Although it is difficult to establish the 
precise order of causation among the different vari-
ables (lack of competition as regards European integra-
tion, the democratic deficit characterizing the EU insti-
tutional framework, and voter apathy), the result is 
clear: a substantial portion of European voters are dis-
connected from the political process at the EU level 
and ignorance of the workings of the EU is widespread 
(Blondel et al. 1998, 240).  
A situation in which voters are indifferent and apa-
thetic does not immediately or automatically entail 
problems with democracy. What matter are the rea-
sons for abstention. If the apathy can be linked to the 
weak legitimacy of the European Union, understood as 
a lack of support among the population for this pa r-
ticular form of government, then those who favor 
party democracy have more reason to be pessimistic 
about the future.  
Satisfaction not guaranteed: the EU’s legitimacy 
deficit 
Public support for European integration has been con-
sistently high across Europe (Raunio and Wiberg 2000, 
159–61). This is very much in line with the pro-
European consensus among the major political parties 
in most European countries. Moreover, further integra-
tion – not to mention EU membership itself – is hardly 
disputed in the Benelux countries, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal. However, in Denmark, Spain, Austria and, 
particularly, the United Kingdom and Sweden, citizens 
are only lukewarm towards European integration and 
since the early 1990s opposition to further European 
integration has greatly increased.  
However, there is widespread dissatisfaction with 
the level of democracy within the European Union. The 
democratic deficit is a matter of concern to a large 
number of citizens. In 1992, only 15% of the respon-
dents in a Europe -wide survey expressed satisfaction 
with the degree of “democratic influence” exerted by 
citizens (Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995). It has been 
argued that EU citizens formulate their assessment of 
democracy in the EU on the basis of what they think 
about their national political institutions (Andersen 
1998). Many Europeans have little knowledge of EU 
institutions and tend to be unable to distinguish be-
tween them (Karp et al. 2003, 277). In order to over-
come the problem of citizens evaluating national 
rather than European institutions, I have summarized 
levels of satisfaction with democracy in western and 
southern Europe in relation to both the national and 
the European level. An overview of recent surveys on 
levels of satisfaction with national democracy is given 
in Table 5 and satisfaction with democracy at the 
European level is presented in Table 6. 
Clearly there are substantial differences between 
European countries regarding evaluation of the func-
tioning of their national democratic system. While Ital-
ians, Portuguese and Greeks are extremely dissatisfied 
with the working of their national democracy, at the 
other end of the scale Danish, Dutch and Irish citizens 
seem relatively satisfied. However, as the Portuguese 
and Spanish cases show, countries can exhibit signifi-
cant variation over time. The most important overall 
point which can be inferred from Table 5 is that, over 
the last ten years, the rate of approval of national de-
mocracies has increased. In Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden more and more citi-
zens say that they are satisfied with the functioning of 
their national democracy. Although clearly a substan-
tial proportion of the population in every European 
country is not satisfied with democratic functioning, 
they tend to constitute a minority. 
Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy 
within the European Union is clearly lower, on average, 
than in the case of national democracies. This is not 
surprising and perhaps reflects the observed democ-
ratic deficit of the European democratic institutional  
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Table 5. Satisfaction with national democracy, 1989–2003 (% of total electorate) 
Country 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 
Austria – – – – – 55 60 64 56 72 65 
Belgium 56 53 59 53 55 28 29 49 60 71 65 
Denmark  70 80 82 68 83 77 84 81 79 88 91 
Finland  – – – – 54 50 50 67 64 70 77 
France 42 47 58 47  48 39 59 60 59 68 
Germany 74 56 63 52 63 45 50 66 54 66 59 
Greece 44 36 31 32 30 38 33 62 53 53 49 
Ireland 57 62 69 65 70 70 75 74 70 69 66 
Italy 22 12 25 19 20 30 28 34 36 34 38 
Netherlands 67 71 64 66 69 71 75 78 80 66 70 
Portugal 71 85 48 55 42 39 35 57 50 35 37 
Spain 37 41 34 31 41 55 51 71 75 70 58 
Sweden – – – – 55 56 56 65 63 77 75 
Gt. Britain 50 45 51 49 48 63 61 64 56 60 60 
Average  52 45 49 49 48 48 57 60 57 59 59 
Source: Eurobarometer.  
Note: Scores are percentages of respondents stating that they are (very) satisfied with the functioning of national democracy. 
Table 6. Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union, 1989–2003 (% of total electorate) 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 
Austria – – 36 40 45 38 29 53 42 
Belgium 55 52 51 30 29 48 59 65 58 
Denmark  40 46 47 31 40 30 36 59 60 
Finland  – – 38 31 27 37 41 43 44 
France 41 32 37 40 34 43 50 47 50 
Germany 38 41 45 28 32 39 39 48 45 
Greece 33 28 35 39 39 41 56 50 51 
Ireland 67 64 57 63 62 60 60 61 60 
Italy 41 33 38 36 35 43 41 45 48 
Netherlands 39 46 45 36 42 43 42 48 48 
Portugal 43 53 35 35 31 51 48 41 42 
Spain 38 37 33 46 43 61 62 58 41 
Sweden – – 19 18 18 19 25 42 41 
Gt. Britain 29 40 30 33 33 32 31 38 34 
Average  42 43 38 36 35 42 43 48 46 
Source: Eurobarometer (various issues).  
Note: Scores are percentages of respondents stating that they are (very) satisfied with the functioning of national democracy. 



















framework. Dissatisfaction with the EU is influenced by 
lack of confidence in the EU institutional framework 
and the weakness of the European Parliament. Some 
countries, such as Italy, deviate from this pattern and 
show higher levels of satisfaction with EU democracy 
than with democracy at home, although this reflects 
domestic democratic problems rather than a positive 
evaluation of the level of democracy at the European 
level. However, in most countries – and particularly in 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK – citi-
zens are more satisfied with their national democracy 
than its EU counterpart. Karp et al. (2003, 280) con-
clude that “unlike most stable democracies but like 
other transnational institutions, the EU is not likely to 
enjoy a reservoir of diffuse support”. Moreover, al-
though we can see an increase in the level of satisfac-
tion with EU democracy over time, the political process 
within the EU will tend to be viewed with skepticism 
by a majority of European citizens. Moreover, the level 
of political knowledge is highly correlated with dissatis-
faction with the workings of EU democracy. For na-
tional democracies the satisfaction level rises as knowl-
edge increases, but for the EU level the correlation is 
negative: dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU in-
creases together with citizens’ political knowledge and 
educational level. In addition, people who tend to dis-
cuss politics more often are also more likely to become 
dissatisfied (Karp et al. 2003, 285–7). 
The structure of political satisfaction within the 
emerging democracies in Eastern Europe differs from 
that in the established democracies (Andersen 1998a; 
1998b; 1999). First of all, satisfaction is significantly 
lower and progressively declining in Eastern Europe: 
greater political freedom (as measured by the Freedom 
House Index) has actually reduced levels of satisfaction. 
While the overall level of satisfaction in established 
democracies hovers around 60%, in Eastern Europe 
satisfaction with national democracy is as low as 35%. 
This is unrelated to political culture or system perform-
ance. Moreover, it seems that particularly in those 
countries which achieved high levels of freedom early 
in the transition there is a substantial number of citi-
zens who are still “uncomfortable with the disorder of 
democracy” (Anderson 1998b). Enthusiasm for EU 
membership is also lower in Eastern Europe, in particu-
lar among state-dependent pensioners and farmers 
(Chichowski 2000). Citizens’ attitudes to EU member-
ship and support for European integration were found 
to be strongly linked to the extent to which they favor 
a free-market economy and are satisfied with the tran-
sition to democracy. Studies also suggest that political 
parties by and large structure public attitudes towards 
membership of the European Union (Anderson 1998a 
and 1999; Taggart 1998; Chichowski 2000). Regard-
less of ideology, political parties that take a clear posi-
tion on European integration provide a cue for citizens 
regarding EU issues. In the words of Chichowski (2000, 
1272), “voters may use party attachment as a proxy to 
answer questions on EU membe rship”.  
The discrepancy: a rupture between de-
mocratic politics and policy-making 
We began by analyzing the disconnection between 
policy-making and mechanisms of democratic control, 
focusing on the almost total absence of the issue of 
European integration from party competition in most 
European countries. National (socioeconomic) issues 
still dominate national politics. Political parties and 
their leaders are evaluated by voters primarily on the 
basis of national socioeconomic policy. 
At the same time, at the European level the  party 
system remains weakly developed in democratic terms. 
The “Europeanization” of national party systems is 
very poorly developed, while the “nationalization” of 
party competition at the European level is substantial. 
Indeed, as already mentioned, European integration 
has tended to strengthen national party leaderships 
and national governments. National political leaders 
are by and large able to dominate policy-making at the 
supra-national level and the process of European inte-
gration has further strengthened the position of na-
tional party elites, particularly those in government. 
This national control over supra-national policy-making 
is secured through the supremacy of nationally elected 
politicians (presidents, prime ministers and ministers) in 
the recruitment and selection of European politicians 
(MEPs and Commissioners). In other words: national 
political parties dominate the recruitment and 
(s)election of politicians at the supra -national level. By 
controlling the careers of supra -national politicians, 
national party leaderships command substantial loyalty 
and discipline. As a result, transnational party organi-
zations in the European Parliament have very little 
autonomy. Thus, at the European level we find a weak 
European Parliament made up of poorly developed su-
pra-national party organizations whose members are 
recruited and selected by national party leaders. 
The same national party leaders also dominate the 
European executive, over which democratic control 
and scrutiny are far below democratic standards (this is 
the so-called “democratic deficit” of the EU) as a result 
of the limited powers of the European Parliament and 
the non-accountability of the executive at the supra-
national level. This democratic deficit can be shown 
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only by default but the arguments are well grounded: 
the institutional framework of the European Union is 
characterized by very low levels of democratic parlia-
mentary control and scrutiny of the executive, com-
bined with a very low level of legitimacy in terms of 
mass support. In addition, there remains a weak link  
between the “popular will” as expressed in Euro-
elections and the formation of the supra -national ex-
ecutive. It is neither a presidential type of democracy 
where the executive is directly elected, nor a parlia-
mentary democracy where the executive originates 
from the legislature (see Hix 1997). What we observe is 
an EU executive made up of national politicians (Coun-
cil of Ministers) and Commissioners appointed by na-
tional states and their political leaders. Again, national 
party leaders emerge as the most powerful actors. 
While this national control over supra-national politi-
cians does not necessarily lead to a democratic deficit 
(since national politicians are themselves subject to 
scrutiny and accountability at the national level), this 
dominance of national political actors means that their 
own declining legitimacy is superimposed upon the 
European level. This decline in the legitimacy of na-
tional political parties is visible in the fact that political 
parties are the least trusted institutions of representa-
tive democratic systems, are rapidly losing members 
and are becoming socially uprooted at an unprece-
dented rate. 
Finally, supra-national policy-making processes and 
EU institutions clearly have a legitimacy deficit: citizens 
are very indifferent towards or dissatisfied with EU in-
stitutions, as indicated by low turnouts at European 
elections and strong dissatisfaction with political insti-
tutions at the EU level. The low level of participation in 
European elections in particular casts doubt upon the 
legitimacy of the EU and its representative institutions. 
Citizens’ basic attitudes to democratic institutions and 
political power-holders have already become more in-
different, even negative (van Deth and Scarbrough 
1995; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Plasser 1999). Add to 
this the problem that many European citizens do not 
understand the very complex institutional framework 
of the EU, and the stage is set for a process in which 
citizens feel increasingly unrepresented and powerless. 
As a result, dissatisfaction with political institutions, 
popular frustration with democratic government, a de-
cline in trust in elected politicians and political parties, 
falling membership of political parties, and a dimin-
ished ability on the part of the political system to solve 
collective problems by means of public policies all coin-
cide with rising political cynicism and apathy. The dis-
crepancy between national politics and supra-national 
policy formation reinforces the erosion of political trust 
and (institutional) participation, creating a fertile 
breeding ground for neo-populist and “anti-system” 
parties (Abedi 2002; Capoccia 2002; van der Brug and 
Fennema 2003; Mény and Surel 2002). Such parties 
politicize popular discontent by combining national po-
litical issues with anti-establishment criticism and cen-
sure of the existing institutions of representative de-
mocracy (see Keman and Krouwel 2003; Kersbergen 
and Krouwel 2003): in this sense populism and other 
anti-system voices are the “thermometer of democ-
racy” (Taggart 2000). 
This brings us back to the beginning of our story. 
The broad pro-integration consensus among the major 
parties in most European countries seems to be one of 
the most powerful factors explaining the level of sup-
port for the EU among European electorates. However, 
the major political parties may find themselves skating 
on thin ice. First, the disconnection between primarily 
national patterns of political competition and the in-
creasingly transnational character of policy-making 
could easily erode both trust in national democratic 
institutions and support for (further) European integra-
tion. This divergence between “politics” and “policy” is 
the most decisive discrepancy facing European states. 
As a result of the process of European integration, na-
tional parliaments have lost a substantial part of their 
ability to control and scrutinize national governments 
and the space for national policy-making is restricted 
and shrinking. National governments and the party 
leaders that make up their executives, on the other 
hand, have strengthened their position. These national 
party leaders use the transnational level of policy-
making as an additional arena enabling them, through 
strategies such as “scapegoating” and the monopoli-
zation of information, progressively to dominate na-
tional parliaments. 
Second, the process of European integration 
strengthens party leaderships within their respective 
party organizations. The grassroots party, with its ac-
tive body of members, is increasingly being neglected 
and professedly more “democratic” procedures are 
being introduced into internal decision-making. Mem-
bership ballots are used only for the selection of party 
leaders and parliamentary representatives: party mem-
bers are not given a significant voice in policy forma-
tion. This supposed “democratization” means that the 
more informed (and, as analysis suggests, probably 
more Eurosceptic) activists are being sidelined in favor 
of the membership at large. The wider membership is 
more likely to support the pro-European party line and 
to endorse the candidates that the leadership puts 
forward for popular election – as already mentioned, 
the more informed citizens are about the workings of 



















the European Union, the more skeptical they tend to 
be. Apparently the democratic deficit of the European 
institutional framework is one of its most salient cha r-
acteristics, for professional observers and “amateurs” 
alike: while policy-making has shifted to the supra -
national level, the institutions of democratic control 
and scrutiny have not kept pace. It is only through 
their firm grip on the recruitment and selection of the 
transnational political elite that national party leaders 
are able to maintain the, in some countries marginal, 
majority opinion in favor of EU membership and (fur-
ther) European integration.  
Third, empirical analysis points to low levels of trust 
in the basic institutions of representative democracy 
and, with only a few exceptions, even lower levels of 
trust in the institutional framework of the European 
Union. Political parties are the least trusted institutions 
within European systems of representative democracy 
and are also experiencing erosion of function. Evi-
dently, national parties in their traditional role as in-
termediaries and mobilizers are failing to maintain their 
(organizational and psychological) links with large parts 
of the electorate. Fewer citizens participate in elec-
tions, particularly in second-order Euro-elections, and 
those who do vote tend to switch between parties 
more often. In addition, a growing number of citizens 
are exiting and re-entering the electorate in an increas-
ingly erratic pattern, making electoral outcomes and 
thus government formation less stable and ever more 
unpredictable. 
These less structured and predictable “electoral 
markets”, with lower levels of political participation 
and higher levels of electoral volatility, provide an op-
portunity structure for populist politicians and anti-
system parties that are able to politicize and mobilize 
the public’s apparently substantial political dissatisfac-
tion, discontent and cynicism. This mobilizing capacity 
of popular cynicism and discontent has resulted in a 
number of new parties many of which exhibit populist 
behavior and use “anti-politics” rhetoric. These “new” 
parties have now entered numerous party systems 
across Europe and have also successfully challenged 
dominant parties. In some countries, such as Italy, Aus-
tria and the Netherlands, populist parties have also en-
tered the executive branch of government. In other 
countries the “new” Left has been quite successful in 
elections and participated in government (Belgium, 
Finland and Germany). (Right-wing) populist parties in 
particular have at their disposal substantial political 
skepticism and dissatisfaction, particularly in relation to 
the leadership of traditional political parties. The 
“strange amalgam of discontents” (Taggart 1998) that 
populist parties are able to tap into is often combined 
with anti-establishment criticism and censure of the 
existing institutions of representative democracy. Fur-
thermore, the neo-populists may have a point when it 
comes to the level of democracy, particularly at the su-
pra-national level. This paper has shown that neo-
populists can politicize real and existing political dis-
content, Euroscepticism and distrust of the major po-
litical institutions, particularly political parties. The lat-
ter, once designed for mass mobilization for the pur-
pose of democratic inclusion, now seem to be entan-
gled in a process in which European integration and its 
democratic deficit feed political cynicism and dissa tis-
faction.  
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